Can you tell us about LLs’ US strategy?
1)LLs sees the US as absolutely critical to its long-term global ambitions. The US legal market stands on its own — much of the highest-value work is kept within US firms — which is why Magic Circle firms have been so keen to break into it. For Linlates, the gap in profitability between US and UK firms has widened, so strengthening the US presence is also key to closing that gap. New York is the firm’s hub, and Linlates has been building aggressively building its own practice team there bit by bit — hiring top partners,such as George Caesy a Legal 500 M&A Hall of Famer, and teams across areas like capital markets, leveraged finance, and restructuring. Linlates has deliberately chosen not to merge with a US firm, unlike some competitors. This sets Linlates apart from its competitors because it preserves the Linlates own brand and own culture while creating a true full-service “one-stop-shop” for clients. This creates a genuinely integrated Linlates team with the same values and service standards they expect in London, Frankfurt, or Hong Kong. Linlates doesn’t just merge with other firms because every other firm is doing it. The difference is that many Magic Circle firms talk about a “one-stop shop,” but Linlates is one of the few that is genuinely investing to make that a reality — not just through alliances and best friend firms, but by growing its own platform in the US. This strategy is already delivering results: the firm reported £3.32 billion in revenues last year, with a strong contribution from the US. Ultimately, this push helps Linlates achieve its strategic ambition of being one of the top 15 global law firms, by offering clients seamless, cross-border service that rivals elite US firms.
2)What makes this strategy bold is that it’s long-term. Instead of chasing scale through mergers, Linlates is investing in building a platform it fully owns and controls. If this succeeds, the firm won’t just have ‘a US arm,’ it will have a truly integrated transatlantic practice — which very few firms in the world can claim. That positions Linlates not just to compete with US firms, but to redefine what it means to be a genuinely global law firm.”
Why is the US such an important market for Ls?
1)Well post-Brexit, London is no longer the undisputed financial centre for Europe, in fact the US is now the largest and most profitable legal market globally. US firms are far more profitable than UK firms, often with double or higher profit-per-equity-partner (PEP). For Linlates, strengthening its US practice is essential to capture more of that high-value US-driven work directly, instead of letting it flow to Wall Street firms. This also allows Linlates to stay competitive and remain at the very top of global deal-making.
2)Also, a huge proportion of cross-border M&A, finance, and capital markets deals are driven out of New York, where New York law and SEC regulations often make US capability and expanding its New York presence is vital. Without a credible US platform, Linlates risks being sidelined and risk losing work to US competitors who can offer both US and international advice. Linlates even risks being sidelined on deals involving longstanding global clients or transactions led out of London.
3)Also for Linlates, having genuine strength in the US is crucial to servicing multinational clients end-to-end. Clients increasingly want a one-stop shop, and with genuine strength in the US, UK, and internationally, Linlates can offer that true seamless global one-stop shop service that offers US, UK, and international advice under one roof, without clients having to split instructions between a Magic Circle firm and a Wall Street firm - which is attractive to clients.
How does Linlate’ approach differ from other Magic Circle firms?
1)Linlates has taken a very deliberate and distinctive approach to the US market compared with its Magic Circle peers. For example, Allen & Overy opted to merge with Shearman & Sterling, and Clifford Chance historically struggled with its merger in New York. Linlates has chosen not to merge but instead to grow organically — hiring leading partners and teams in areas like capital markets, leveraged finance, and restructuring. This approach sets Linlates apart because it avoids the integration and culture challenges that often come with mergers, while still building genuine full-service capability in New York. It shows the firm is confident enough not to ‘merge for the sake of merging,’ but to invest steadily in a platform that protects its brand and culture.
2) If Linlates succeeds in establishing itself as a credible alternative to elite US firms on their home turf, it positions the firm not just as another Magic Circle firm with a US presence, but as one of the few global firms that can truly claim to be integrated across all major markets. For clients, that’s invaluable. They want consistency across jurisdictions, but they also want the reassurance that their counsel is competitive at the very top of the US market. They know that wherever they instruct Linlates — London, New York, Hong Kong — they’re getting the same high-quality service, which is harder to guarantee when firms grow through bolt-on mergers. By pursuing organic growth, Linlates is building a US platform on its own terms, which makes it more resilient long-term and allows the firm to focus on what clients actually care about: seamless service, brand quality, and global reach. So Linlates’ strategy is not only distinctive in the Magic Circle, but its building a platform that could redefine what it means to be a global firm
Why do you think clients care about Ls’ US growth?
Clients care about Ls’ US growth because it directly affects deal certainty, regulatory consistency, and the firm’s ability to deliver seamless advice on transactions that are increasingly transatlantic. It’s not just about being bigger in the US — it’s about integrating New York into the firm’s existing cross-border platform so clients receive one coherent global answer rather than a patchwork of local views.
Clients need deal certainty in US-involved transactions. Most large-cap global M&A, tech, finance and restructuring work has a US nexus — whether because the counterparty is American, the financing is syndicated out of New York, or the antitrust/FDI profile involves US regulators. If Ls can strengthen its US corporate and regulatory bench, clients get faster alignment across London–New York, fewer external counsel conflicts, and a more predictable execution timetable.
Clients want one firm to handle increasingly interconnected regulation. Regulatory regimes are converging, especially in tech, competition, AI, sanctions and financial services. Clients increasingly want a firm that can interpret US, UK and EU regulatory direction together — not three separate advisers giving three slightly different reads. Ls’ US build-out gives multinational clients a single strategic view of regulatory risk across all three hubs.
Clients want access to a transatlantic M&A pipeline. Many of Ls’ corporate clients — particularly in tech, life sciences, energy transition and financial institutions — want a firm that can originate and execute deals on both sides of the Atlantic. The recent senior hires in New York signal that Ls is building exactly that: a tech-aware, cross-border M&A pipeline. For clients, this means deeper sector insight and fewer hand-offs.
Clients value integration far more than expansion. Clients aren’t interested in Ls simply having a larger headcount in New York; what matters is integration with London, Frankfurt and Paris. They want a firm where their UK team and their US team speak the same language, follow the same processes, and understand their business the same way. This is where Ls differentiates itself from US firms with chaotic cross-office integration.
What risks or challenges do you think Linlate faces in growing its US practice?
1)The US market is the most competitive globally, with deeply entrenched Wall Street firms that dominate high-value mandates. Recruiting and retaining top partners in that environment is expensive, and there’s always the risk of high lateral movement if integration isn’t handled well.
2)Another challenge is culture. Linlates has a very distinct international culture, and the US market can be more individualistic. Ensuring the New York office feels fully part of the global platform — rather than an outpost — is critical because without this the firm’s long-term cohesion, brand and client experience, could be diluted.
3)There’s also the reality that organic growth is slower. Building brand recognition in the US without the shortcut of a merger takes time, which means the firm must keep investing consistently before the returns are fully visible.
4)That said, these risks also create opportunities. The fact that Linlates is willing to take the slower, more deliberate route means the firm can avoid the cultural clashes or client conflicts that sometimes undermine mergers. If it succeeds, Linlates will not just have ‘a US arm,’ but a genuinely integrated, sustainable practice — and that’s exactly what will differentiate it in the long run.”
Why do you think Linlate hasn’t merged in the US when some competitors have?
emerging can create client conflicts, inconsistent service standards, and cultural mismatches. As Linlates brand and culture are central to its global reputation, merging is too big a risk. By building organically, Linlates keeps control. Every lateral hire is aligned with the firm’s strategy, every practice area is built where it adds value, and every new partner is fully integrated into the global culture. That’s slower, but it’s also much more sustainable.
In fact, I’d argue that not merging is itself a differentiator. It shows clients and recruits that Linlates won’t compromise just to chase scale. Instead, it’s building a US platform deliberately, and in a way that ensures the same quality and culture clients already associate with Linlates worldwide.”
Why would you want to train at a firm like Ls over a US firm in London (like Kirkland or Latham)
I want to train at Ls over a US firm because of its deliberate, organic approach to the US market. For me, that is a clear differentiator over a firm like Kirkland or Latham.
a) Unlike some competitors who have opted for large-scale mergers (like A&O Shearman), Ls has chosen to grow bit-by-bit. I think this is a critical strategic move because mergers often create cultural mismatches and inconsistent service standards. By building organically—hiring rainmakers like George Casey (Global Chairman of Corporate) and teams in Leveraged Finance and Restructuring—Ls protects its ‘DNA.’ It ensures that whether a client is in London, New York, or Hong Kong, they receive the same high-quality, seamless service that the brand is built on.
b) Strategically, this is about more than just presence; it’s about competitiveness. The US is the most profitable legal market, and for Ls to achieve its goal of being in the top 15 for global deal-making, it must capture that high-value work. We’re already seeing this deliver results—last year, while revenues grew significantly to £2.32 billion, it was the US that saw a 57% jump in profit. This proves that Ls isn’t just ‘visiting’ New York; it’s establishing itself as a credible, elite alternative to Wall Street firms on their own turf.
c) For a trainee, this ‘One-Stop-Shop’ model changes everything. Instead of deals being managed in silos, I’d be exposed to transactions where US, UK, and EU considerations are managed as one integrated team. You see this in the recent Rio Tinto acquisition of Arcadium Lithium ($6.7bn), where George Casey led a transatlantic team across New York and London. As a trainee, learning ‘at the feet’ of hall-of-famers like Casey while the firm is benchmarking its standards against the best of New York is an incredibly motivating environment.
what practise areas or sector should Ls develop further?
Ls already has a world-class platform, but if I had to identify where the firm could deepen its capabilities further, I’d focus on the intersections where the firm is already strategically investing: the convergence of tech regulation, digital markets, and its US-linked corporate/M&A pipeline.
1st area: Ls’ recent transatlantic hires — particularly in New York — signal a deliberate push to strengthen its US corporate and tech-driven M&A practice. Expanding this further, especially in tech/AI-heavy sectors like semiconductors, fintech and life sciences, would accelerate the firm’s ambition to anchor itself in the top tier of global M&A work. No other Magic Circle firm has replicated Ls’ exact strategy of building a tech-informed transatlantic deal flow.
2nd area: scaling the Digital & Tech Regulatory Group (unique Lins offering). Ls built one of the first integrated Digital & Tech regulatory teams, advising on AI liability, the EU AI Act, the DMA and digital competition issues before most competitors had a position. Deepening this group further — especially its AI governance and platform-regulation capabilities — would cement the firm’s role as the go-to adviser for global companies navigating transformative digital regulation.
3rd: strengthening its private capital offering around tech, infrastructure & energy. Ls has been growing its private capital practice, particularly across Luxembourg, London and the US, and there’s a real opportunity to build out capabilities focused on the tech, infrastructure and energy-transition sectors. Given the firm’s deep European regulatory bench and its corporate/finance scale, expanding this intersection of private capital + regulated sectors could differentiate Ls from competitors in a meaningful way.
So, I wouldn’t say Ls needs to expand in entirely new directions — the real opportunity is to double down on the areas where the firm has already created a strategic edge: tech-driven regulation, its transatlantic M&A capability, and private capital in regulated sectors. Those are uniquely Ls opportunities.
who are their competitors? / What is the biggest threat to Ls right now?
1)I believe the biggest threat to Ls right now is the competitive pressure on our business model from US ‘Elite’ firms. US firms like Kirkland & Ellis and Paul Weiss use a ‘lean’ business model with smaller teams and massive cash reserves. They are aggressively poaching our top partners by offering compensation that traditional ‘Lockstep’ models struggle to match. As a trainee, I see this as a threat because losing a key partner often means losing their entire client relationship. Furthermore,
2)Silver circle firms - because silver circle firms charge less so are more likely to get the more mid-range work becaus ethe work might not warrant going to a magic circle firm
3)other full service firms - Ls “leverage” is its unique combination of breadth and depth: breadth: Ls cover almost every area of corporate law (“full-service”); Depth: Ls are large, highly skilled, and commercially savvy, which many other full-service firms aren’t. This puts Ls in the sweet spot for handling very large, very complex deals—the “heart of the Venn diagram.” Because so few firms can match this combination, Ls wins the most lucrative and high-profile mandates. Their track record includes “hyper-complex mega-mergers”.
4)The big 4 accountancy firms because Pwc, Ey all have legal departments offering training contracts and so Linlates could be loosing clients but also talent
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
You mentioned ‘regulatory orthodoxy.’ Why has the CMA traditionally blocked 4-to-3 mergers in the mobile market?”
The CMA is the UK’s primary competition authority. Its role is to promote competition for the benefit of consumers, ensuring that markets stay fair, efficient, and innovative by reviewing mergers, investigating anti-competitive practices, and enforcing consumer protection law. The CMA’s starting point is usually a ‘structural’ concern: that moving from 4 to 3 players reduces price competition. However, the role of a firm like Ls is to provide a counter-narrative—demonstrating that in infrastructure-heavy markets like TMT, quality of service and investment are just as important to the ‘consumer welfare’ test as the monthly price of a SIM card.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
“What is the difference between a ‘Structural Remedy’ and a ‘Behavioral Remedy’ (like the investment commitment)
Structural = Selling off masts/spectrum (clean break).
Behavioral = A promise to do something (investment), which requires ongoing monitoring.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
How does an £11bn investment commitment actually benefit the consumer in the long run?
It accelerates 5G roll-out. Ls argued that having 3 “strong” networks with great 5G is better for consumers than 4 “weak” networks with patchy signals.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
As a VOXI (Vodafone) customer, if the signal doesn’t improve by 2027, what legal recourse is there based on the ‘Network Commitment’?
Mention the monitoring role of Ofcom. The commitment isn’t just a PR promise; it’s a legally binding obligation in the merger clearance.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
Why is a ‘Network Commitment’ harder for a law firm to negotiate than a simple divestiture?
It requires drafting complex, long-term monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that satisfy Ofcom and the CMA for a decade or more.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
But what if the CMA had rejected the behavioral remedy? Would the deal have been a failure, or was there another path?
That’s where Ls’ multidisciplinary approach wins. If the behavioral remedy failed, the focus would have shifted to Structural Remedies (selling assets), but Ls’ ‘pioneering’ move was proving that in a 5G economy, investment matters more than just the number of players. It was a calculated risk that paid off.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
So what legal risks do you think mattered most on this deal?”
While there were many, the pivot from Structural to Behavioural remedies was the most critical legal risk. Historically, the CMA prefers structural remedies—forcing companies to sell off masts or spectrum. Ls had to mitigate the risk that the CMA would block the deal by negotiating an unprecedented £11bn Network Investment Commitment. This turned a ‘negative’ competition risk into a ‘positive’ industrial benefit, but it created a secondary risk: enforceability. Ls had to structure milestones that Ofcom could legally monitor for the next decade.
The second most critical risk was the NSIA hurdle. Because Three is owned by CK Hutchison (a Hong Kong-based conglomerate), the Cabinet Office conducted a full national security assessment. The risk was a government veto due to concerns over foreign access to ‘Critical National Infrastructure’ and sensitive data (Vodafone is a major government supplier). Ls mitigated this by helping the parties agree to a Final Order in May 2024. This included creating a National Security Committee within the merged company to oversee sensitive work and ensuring the network migration was audited by a government-approved third party. It shows that in 2026, M&A isn’t just corporate law—it’s Geopolitics.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
Why was Ls the right firm for this deal? / Why do you think Ls was able to succeed here where other firms failed in previous 4-to-3 attempts?
This deal sat at the intersection of Public M&A, Antitrust, and National Security. You needed a firm that could handle the Hong Kong/Cayman tax and corporate structure for CK Hutchison while simultaneously running a Band 1 Antitrust defense in London. Ls’ ‘one-firm’ approach meant that Rich Jones (TMT) and Robert Cleaver (Corporate) weren’t working in silos—they were building a single, unified ‘regulatory bridge’ for the client that integrated technical telecoms reality with competition law.”
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
Why did YOU personally care about deals like this?
I’m fascinated by how law acts as the architect for a country’s critical infrastructure. Without this legal solution, the UK would likely have remained a ‘5G laggard’ in Europe. I enjoy seeing how a complex Shareholders’ Agreement isn’t just a document—it’s the foundation for £11bn of investment that will eventually affect every school and hospital in the country. I want to work on deals where the ‘legal work’ has a direct, visible impact on the UK’s economic future.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
You mentioned the NSIA hurdles. Why was the UK government concerned about this merger from a National Security perspective?”
Telecommunications is “Critical National Infrastructure.” Vodafone/Three involves a foreign stakeholder (CK Hutchison), which triggers the government’s power to intervene under the NSIA 2021.
ThreeGroup-Vodaphone deal follow up Question1:
If you were advising, what would you have worried about?
I would have been most worried about the NSIA (National Security) hurdle. Given Three’s ownership by CK Hutchison (based in Hong Kong), there was a significant risk of a ‘security veto’ from the Cabinet Office. I would have focused on the Governance Protections—ensuring that the National Security Committee within the new ‘MergeCo’ was robust enough to satisfy the government that UK data and critical systems were insulated from foreign interference. It’s a risk that doesn’t just end at closing; it requires permanent compliance.
Why has Ls chosen to focus on Paris and Stockholm, what’s the benefit of those hubs?
Paris and Stockholm weren’t chosen randomly — they sit at the heart of Europe’s most active private equity and financing ecosystems.
What Ls has done is shift from a model of broad geographic coverage to a model of deep strength in the hubs where global sponsors actually deploy capital.
Paris has become a major centre for restructuring, leveraged finance and sponsor-led M&A. Stockholm, on the other hand, has seen a surge in capital markets activity, which is why Ls’ work on Verisure’s €3.6bn IPO was such a strategic signal. Focusing on these hubs means the firm can offer financial sponsors a seamless, full-cycle service across fundraising, acquisitions, financing and exits — without needing an oversized footprint. It’s a disciplined strategy that mirrors how clients actually operate.
To me, this clarity of focus — depth over breadth — is exactly what makes Ls’ international strategy so compelling.
Where would we close an office and what you impact do you think that would have on Ls as a business?
Ls currently has three offices in a very small geographic area: Dubai(City in UAE), Abu Dhabi (Capital of UAE), and Riyadh (Capital of Saudi Arabia). In my view, keeping all three is commercially inefficient, so I would suggest Abu Dhabi office closure:
a) As we see with major tech firms like Adobe, the Saudi RHQ Law (that any client wanting government contracts must have their HQ in Riyadh) has shifted the region’s focus toward Riyadh. Since Ls has already secured an independent Saudi license and is growing the Riyadh team, if our clients are required to base their decision-makers in Saudi Arabia to access government projects, we should prioritize Riyadh as our main regional growth engine.
b) Secondly, the Ls offices in Abu Dhabi and Dubai are physically very close to eachother. Furthermore, the majority of their high-value, cross-border M&A work for Abu Dhabi clients is already handled by our teams in London, New York, or our Dubai hub. Therefore, keeping a full building and staff in Abu Dhabi is an unnecessary overhead cost. This capital is better spent on the large-scale infrastructure projects currently booming in Saudi Arabia.
c) Thirdly, closing down the Abu Dhabi office would allow the Riyadh office to be used for government work, and the Dubai office to be used as our global financial centre.
d)By closing the Abu Dhabi office, Ls can also reallocate that capital. We can reallocate capital to not only hire the best Saudi-qualified lawyers in Riyadh—who are currently in extremely high demand—ensuring we dominate the most active market, but Ls can also generates the cash flow needed to fuel its US expansion. I read that Ls reported a 57% profit growth in the US precisely because we reinvested our capital into top-tier New York talent. By exiting the smaller Abu Dhabi office, Ls can continue this ‘Big Bang’ growth in the US and Asia, where the return on investment is clearly much higher.
In which country should we open our NEXT office?
If I had to pick our next office location, I’d suggest Silicon Valley. Even though we are already strong in New York and DC, I think being physically present in Northern California is a great next step for a few simple reasons:
a) Ls is famous for its work in energy and infrastructure. Today, we’re seeing a huge trend where tech and energy are coming together—for example, the massive data centers needed for AI that require their own green power sources. California is the heart of this innovation. If we are there on the ground, we can build relationships with these companies early on, helping them grow from small startups into the global giants that need our complex legal advice.
b)Another key reason for opening an office in California is to stay close to our most important Financial Sponsor clients. Firms like BlackRock have dedicated teams in Silicon Valley that focus entirely on tech and private markets. While we can support them from New York, being in their time zone and being able to meet them for coffee makes a huge difference in building those early-stage relationships. We can actually see this strategy in action with our work for BlackRock. Although they are the world’s largest asset manager, their recent £2.55 billion acquisition of Preqin—which Ls advised on—proves they are aggressively moving into private market data. By having a team on the ground in California, where ‘Fintech’ and private capital intersect, we can win these mandates right where the decisions are made.This helps us win their smaller tech deals today, which eventually turn into the massive cross-border projects that fuel Ls 57% US profit growth.
c) Our recent financial results were record-breaking, especially in the US where profits grew by 57%. This shows that our strategy of investing in top US talent is working. By opening in California, we show the market that we aren’t just a UK firm with a US branch—we are a truly national US player. It helps us compete head-to-head with the ‘Elite’ American firms for the world’s biggest IPOs and mergers.
Which practice areas do you think are growing at our firm and why?
Apart from the US-linked M&A and transatlantic growth that I already discussed, I would say one of the fastest-growing areas at Ls is Tech, Digital, AI and broader TMT and data regulation. This is because clients across every sector are now facing digital transformation, AI adoption, platform regulation and increasingly complex data governance requirements — and these issues don’t sit within one legal discipline. They cut across corporate, competition, IP, regulatory, cyber and disputes.”
“Ls is in a particularly strong position here because of its ability to deliver integrated, cross-border advice. We’re seeing the EU AI Act, the Digital Markets Act, tightening cyber requirements, and new national security and data localisation rules globally. Clients need a firm that can help them anticipate how these frameworks interact across jurisdictions. Ls’ global regulatory bench and multi-jurisdictional TMT team make it well placed to support clients on both advisory and transactional matters.”
“I think this area will continue to grow because digital and AI issues are no longer optional — they’re now core to investment strategy, deal structuring, competition risk, and regulatory exposure. And given Ls’ track record in complex cross-border regulatory matters, it’s natural that this will remain a major growth engine for the firm.
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