Hedonistic utilitarianism on eating animals
If pleasure and pain are the only morally important things, then the pain or pleasure animals feel will be relevant. Eating animals will be wrong if the total pain produced outweighs the total pleasure.
Hedonistic utilitarianism on simulated killing
Simulated killing is only wrong if the total pain produced outweighs the total pleasure produced.
Hedonistic utilitarianism on telling lies
Telling lies will only be wrong if the pain produced outweighs the pleasure produced.
Hedonistic utilitarianism on stealing
Stealing will only be wrong if the pain produced outweighs the pleasure produced.
Kantian deontological ethics on eating animals
Animals are not rational, so eating animals does not go against either formulation of the categorical imperative, so would not be wrong
Kantian deontological ethics on simulated killing
Simulated killing does not seem to go against either formulation of the categorical imperative, so would not be wrong
Kantian deontological ethics on telling lies
Lying goes against both formulations of the categorical imperative, so is always morally wrong
Kantian deontological ethics on stealing
Stealing goes against both formulations of the categorical imperative, so is always morally wrong.
Aristotle on eating animals
Whether eating animals is right or wrong depends upon whether it makes someone more or less virtuous. This may depend upon the situatio
Aristotle on simulated killing
Simulated killing is wrong if it does not lead to the development of virtuous character traits
Aristotle on telling lies
Whether lying is right or wrong depends upon whether it makes someone more or less virtuous. This may depend upon the situatio
Aristotle on stealing
Whether stealing is right or wrong depends upon whether it makes someone more or less virtuous which depends on the situation
Ethical non-naturalists
If the action is wrong then it has a non-natural property which can be intuited
Ethical naturalists
If the action is wrong then it has a natural property which can be known empirically
Error theorists
None of these actions have properties of moral rightness or wrongness, because these properties do not exist.
Emotivists
When we make talk about the morality of these issues we are doing no more than expressing our emotions about them
Prescriptivists
When we make talk about the morality of these issues we are doing no more than uttering imperatives