FuE

Question 1

What is functionalism?

Answer 1

All mental states are functional/causal roles which can be multiply realised

Question 2

functional duplicate

Answer 2

all the functional truths that are true of one of them are true of the other. According to functionalists, two things that are functional duplicates are (or should be) mentally identical.

Question 3

The functionalist view on qualia

Answer 3

P1: Qualia are mental properties.

P2: All mental properties are functional roles.

C: Therefore qualia are functional roles

C: Therefore, qualia are multiply realisable

Question 4

Block’s China thought experiment

Answer 4

P1: If functionalism is true then functional duplicates must be the same mentally

P2: However, it is conceivable for functional duplicates to differ mentally. Ned block and “China brain” are complete functional duplicates
Ned has qualia but the “China brain” has no qualia

C: Therefore, functionalism is false

Question 5

Inverted qualia argument

Answer 5

P1: If functionalism is true then functional duplicates must be the same mentally

P2: However, it is conceivable for functional duplicates to differ mentally. A and B are complete functional duplicates
A has qualia but B has different/inverted qualia
e.g colours.

C: Therefore, functionalism is false

Question 6

Response 1 to China Thought and Inverted Qualia

Answer 6

The scenario is possible, but qualia are not essential properties of a mental state, so functionalism can still fully explain mental states.

Question 7

Counter-response: Qualia are essential properties of (at least some) mental states, so functionalism is false

Answer 7

Qualia might even be the most important aspect of the mind e.g. the painfulness of pain is what makes it pain, Descartes cogito (qualia explains the existence of the mind)

Question 8

Response: Restricted functionalism (/a hybrid theory)

Answer 8

Functionalists admit they cannot give a functional explanation of the phenomenal features of minds, but argue that they can explain the intentional of the mind. E.g. They can give an accurate account of beliefs

Question 9

Counter response to restricted functionalism

Answer 9

1)This leaves qualia a mystery

2) If the scenarios are possible then there can be a difference in qualia without this making any difference to (physical) function. But this seems to show that qualia is
(a) non-physical and
(b) ‘epiphenomenal’

Question 10

Response 2 to China Thought and Inverted Qualia

Answer 10

The scenarios are not possible

-The intuition that the ‘China mind’ would not have qualia is just prejudice. It is no less bizarre than the lump of matter within your skull being conscious.

-You would be able to tell the difference

Question 11

Knowledge’/Mary argument

Answer 11

P1: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the functional facts

P2: After seeing red for the first time Mary gains propositional knowledge of a new mental fact - a phenomenal fact

C1:Therefore, there are some mental facts that are not functional facts.

P3: Non-functional mental facts must be about non-functional mental properties.

C2: Therefore, there are some non-functional mental properties

C3: Therefore functionalism is false

Question 12

Response to mary argument

Answer 12

Mary gains no new propositional knowledge and instead on that day she just realises the functional state “seeing red” for the first time. This then means that she is functionally different, and so can go from inputs to outputs in ways she couldn’t before. Something new happens in terms of what she is able to do, but no new propositional knowledge.

Question 13

ISSUE: There is still propositional knowledge that Mary gains FROM realising that function for the first time

Answer 13

Mary gains more than just abilities because we can imagine a scenario where she does not gain abilities, but still learns something. And even if she does gain abilities, she also learns what having that functional state feels like, which is additional to it. Mary gains propositional knowledge that can’t be gained by understanding the functional facts alone.