Du

Question 1

Substance dualism

Answer 1

There are two distinct types of ‘stuff’: physical and non-physical

So minds are not identical to material bodies or to parts of material bodies

Question 2

Property dualism

Answer 2

Physical ‘stuff’ has two distinct kinds of properties: physical and non-physical properties

So mental properties are not identical to physical properties

Question 3

Descartes substance dualism

Answer 3

Minds exist and are not identical to material bodies or to parts of material bodies.

There is a non-physical realm in which non-physical minds exist which is entirely separate from the physical realm

The ‘principle attribute’ of mental substance is thinking/consciousness (it is called res cogitans / thinking substance).

The ‘principle attribute’ of physical substance is extension in space (it is called res extensa / extended substance).

Question 4

res cogitans

Answer 4

thinking substance

Question 5

res extensa

Answer 5

extended substance

Question 6

Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism

Answer 6

P1: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body

P2: Anything that I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is metaphysically possible

C1: Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible.

P3: If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.

C2: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body.

Question 7

Descartes’ indivisibility argument for substance dualism

Answer 7

P1: My mind and my mental states cannot be conceived of as being divided

P2: Everything thought of as physical can be conceived of as being divided.

C: Therefore: minds and mental states are not physical.

Question 8

The mary argument for property dualism

Answer 8

P1: Mary has propositional knowledge about all physical properties

P2: After seeing red for the first time Mary gains propositional knowledge.

P3: If she gains propositional knowledge then this knowledge must be about non physical properties.

C1: Therefore, there are non-physical properties.

C2: Therefore, property dualism is true.

Question 9

Zombies argument for property dualism

Answer 9

P1: A zombie world is conceivable.

P2: If a zombie world is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible.

C1: Therefore, a zombie world is metaphysically possible.

P3: If a zombie world is metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are not physical properties.

C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not physical properties.

Question 10

Philosophical zombie

Answer 10

something physically identical to a conscious human being but which lacks consciousness entirely