DuE

Question 1

Descartes indivisibility argument for substance dualism

Answer 1

P1: My mind cannot be conceived of as being divided.
P2: Everything in the physical world can be conceived of as being divided.
C: Therefore: minds and mental states are distinct from the physical world

Question 2

the mental is divisible in some sense (parts of a mind)

Answer 2

We can talk about desires as being distinct from thoughts and hopes. And we can subdivide hopes up into hopes about the weather tomorrow and hopes about the tennis result etc

Question 3

the mental is divisible in some sense (DID)

Answer 3

Someone diagnosed with DID may feel the presence of other identities, each with their own names, voices, personal histories and mannerisms

Cases of mental illness, suggests that the mind can be divided. In such cases, it seems that some ‘parts’ of the person’s mind are unable to communicate with other ‘parts’. So it makes sense to talk about ‘parts’ of the mind.

Question 4

Response to parts of a mind objection (These are not different parts, they are different functions/powers of one mind)

Answer 4

Bodies are spatially divisible, while minds are only functionally divisible.

Question 5

Response to DID objection (there are two minds)

Answer 5

this is just a case of two whole indivisible minds, connected up to the same one body. It is NOT a case of there being one mind with two parts.

Question 6

not everything thought of as physical is divisible objection to substance dualism

Answer 6

behaviours like “running” are normally considered to be physical, but you they are not divisible

being 30 degrees centigrade

The implication of these reflections is that it may not be an essential or defining property of every physical substance that it is divisible

Question 7

Descartes conceivability argument

Answer 7

P1: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing.

P2: Anything that I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is metaphysically possible

C1: Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible.

P3: If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.

C2: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body

Question 8

Mind without body is not conceivable

Answer 8

we can’t conceive of consciousness without anything physical existing. Saying we can conceive of consciousness without the physical is like saying we can conceive of someone being ‘healthy’ without having any bodily organs and systems. We are making a mistake.

Question 9

What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible objection

Answer 9

The fact that I can conceive of the mind existing without the body doesn’t mean that this is possible.

Water without H2O is conceivable but impossible
-conceivable because “water = H2O” is NOT an analytic truth (it is a posteriori synthetic truth)
-Impossible because “water = H2O” is a necessary truth

“Mind without body” could be the same:
-conceivable because “mind = physical” is NOT an analytic truth (it is a posteriori synthetic truth)
-Impossible because “mental = physical” is a necessary truth

Question 10

What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world objection

Answer 10

Even if there’s a ‘possible world’ in which dualism is true, in this world it is false and consciousness is physical.

Question 11

Philosophical zombie argument

Answer 11

P1: A zombie world* is conceivable.

P2: Whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible.

C1: Therefore, a zombie world is metaphysically possible.

P3: If a zombie world is metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties.

C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties.

Question 12

The Mary / knowledge argument for property dualism

Answer 12

P1: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the physical facts

P2: After seeing red for the first time Mary gains propositional knowledge of a new phenomenal fact

C1: Therefore, there are some facts that are not physical facts.

P3: Non-physical facts must be about non-physical properties.

C2: Therefore, there are some non-physical properties

Question 13

the ‘ability knowledge’ response

Answer 13

She gains ability knowledge: the ability to imagine, recognise red, classify objects by their redness not propositional knowledge. This is compatible with physicalism as she is merely gaining an ability to do something.

Question 14

Response to ability knowledge objection

Answer 14

Mary gains more than just abilities 9because we can imagine a scenario where she does not gain abilities, but still learns something). She gains qualia.

Question 15

the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response

Answer 15

Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge. This is compatible with physicalism because if Mary merely gains acquaintance knowledge this does not mean there are any new non-physical facts that she has learned about. What she is now acquainted with, according to the physicalist, is the physical property (qualia) which she already had complete propositional knowledge about.

Question 16

the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response

Answer 16

The same fact can be known in more than one way, and that what happens in the Mary case is that she knows a physical fact one way before ‘release’, and the same fact a different way after ‘release’. Mary comes to understand/know an old fact in a new way using new concepts which you cannot get unless you have the experience.

Question 17

She gains propositional knowledge, but this means it must be about new (and so non-physical) facts/properties response to ‘new knowledge’ objection

Answer 17

For Mary to have a new way of knowing, she must have learnt about a new property (i.e. qualia) she didn’t already know about. She knew all the physical properties, so this must be a non-physical property.

Question 18

Interactionist dualism

Answer 18

(1) Dualism is true, so minds are, in some sense, non-physical.
(2) What happens in the physical body/brain causally affects the mind.
(3) What happens in the non-physical mind causally affects the physical brain/body.

Question 19

The conceptual (a priori) interaction problem against interactionism

Answer 19

P1:It is inconceivable that causation of something physical could occur without contact and this requires that both cause and effect are physical.

P2: If a state of affairs is inconceivable then it is metaphysically impossible.

C1:Therefore, it is metaphysically impossible for causation to occur without physicality.

P3:Interactionist dualists claim that non-physical minds both cause and are causally affected by the physical world.

C2: Therefore, interactionist dualism is false.

Question 20

Non-physical to physical interaction is conceivable and so is metaphysically possible and you only think it’s inconceivable because you are thinking in terms of physical-physical causation response to conceptual interaction problem

Answer 20

the differences between mind and body don’t stop me being able to conceive of them interacting. For example, telekinesis.

There are other kinds of causation, other than physical causation

Question 21

The empirical and inductive interaction problem

Answer 21

P1: If interactionist dualism were true then the law of conservation of energy would be false
(since energy would have to be added to the physical world by the mind when it causes events in the physical brain/body)

P2: We have good a posteriori evidence that the law of conservation of energy is true and and no good evidence of any exceptions to it

C2:Therefore, interactionist dualism is probably false.

Question 22

Epiphenomentalism dualism

Answer 22

(1) Dualism is true, so minds are, in some sense, non-physical.

(2) What happens in the physical body causally affects the mind.

(3) What happens in the mind has either no effects at all or at least no physical effects.

Question 23

the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge against epiphenomentalist dualism

Answer 23

P1:Something that has no effects at all can’t be known about.

C1:Therefore if my mind / mental states had no effects, it would be impossible for me to know about my mind.

P3: But I do know about my mind through introspection - introspective self-knowledge

C2: Therefore, minds / mental states must have effects, and epiphenomenalism dualism is false.

Question 24

Accept that while the mental has no physical effects it does have mental effects response to introspective self-knowledge objection

Answer 24

the mental can cause the mental (as is required for introspective self-knowledge). It just can’t cause anything physical.

Question 25

The challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life

Answer 25

mental events seem, within our experience, to be causes . This experience of mental events as causes of physical events shows us that epiphenomenalist dualism is false. For example, a mental state may cause a behaviour (as in pain causing you to scream)

Question 26

It seems like mental states are causes, but in fact they are not: we are confusing correlation with causation

Answer 26

While phenomenologically it seems that mental events cause other mental events and physical events, this does not mean that this is actually happening A mental state (e.g. a desire) might seem to cause a physical event (e.g. an action) because the same brain state causes them both.

Question 27

The challenge posed by natural selection / evolution against epiphenomentalism dualism

Answer 27

mental states (i.e. consciousness) would never have evolved if they hadn't given us a survival advantage. But this would require that mental states affect our physical bodies. The development of consciousness must be explainable through natural selection. But a property can be selected for only if it has an effect upon organisms' behavior. Therefore, consciousness (both qualia and intentional states) must have effects in behavior, i.e., epiphenomenalism is false.

Question 28

The epistemological problem of other minds

Answer 28

P1: Knowledge of minds requires direct experience of them. P2: If dualism is true then I cannot directly experience anyone’s mind other than my own. C1: Therefore, if dualism is true, I cannot have knowledge that others have minds P3: But common-sense tells me that I do have knowledge of other minds C2: Therefore dualism is in conflict with common-sense (a reason to think it is false)

Question 29

Response to epistemological problem of other minds: The argument from analogy

Answer 29

P1: I have experienced a constant correlation between types of bodily input and types of behavioural output in myself and others. P2: For me, the bodily inputs cause mental states which are then the cause of the behavioural output. P3: Similar events normally have similar causes C: Therefore, other people probably have mental states like mine that are playing a similar causal role. doesn't work in favour of epiphenomentalism

Question 30

Counter-response 1: This is an unjustified generalisation because it is from just one case (against the argument from analogy)

Answer 30

You are basing your belief off of one case, ourselves, what if we were unique? We are making a generalisation.

Question 31

It is still a justified generalisation (we are in a better case than with the cherry example)

Answer 31

Every time I see a causal connection between the inputs, my mental states and my behaviours, I become more and more sure of the causal connection between them. As you grow older, you have more and more evidence of this. So you are not using one case. You are using thousands of cases These multiple cases prove there is a causal connection between the mental and the physical, not just a correlation

Question 32

Dualist response: the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis - an abductive argument against the epistemological problem of other minds

Answer 32

The hypothesis that other people have minds is the best scientific hypothesis to explain their behaviour. Unlike the argument from analogy, it is not based on what you know about yourself, but instead asks OBJECTIVELY what hypothesis best explains the existence, complexity and regularity of other people’s behaviour.

Question 33

counter response to the existence of other minds being the best hypothesis

Answer 33

1. we cannot ever check that this hypothesis is true 2. It does not tell us anything about what these minds are like