IR

Question 1

Indirect realism

Answer 1

During perception we are aware of a representation of the external world

Question 2

John Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction

Answer 2

Primary qualities cause ideas that resemble them, secondary qualities do not.

Question 3

Primary qualities

Answer 3

A property that the mind-independent object has which gives it the power to cause ideas / sense-data in my mind that resemble the property the object really has.

Question 4

Secondary quality

Answer 4

A property that the mind-independent object has which gives it the power to cause ideas / sense-data in my mind that do not resemble the property that the object really has.

Question 5

John Locke’s arguments supporting his primary/secondary quality distinction

Answer 5

P1: (Difference 1: Variation)
An object cannot be perceived to be spherical to the left hand and cubical to the right hand. Whereas, the same object can be perceived to be cold to the left hand and warm to the right hand. Locke means felt-temperature not measured temperature.

P2: (Difference 2: Conceivability)
A object cannot be conceived of as existing without a shape. Whereas, an object can be conceived of as existing without a colour.
We can conceive of a colourless physical object but we are unable to conceive of a shapeless physical object.

P3: (Difference 3: Multi-sensory)
An object can be perceived to be spherical by more than one sense
Whereas, the same object cannot be perceived to have a colour by more than one sense. The idea here seems to be that if more than one sense can access it then it is more likely to be a genuine property of the object.

P4: These three differences give us good reason to think that our ideas of shape resemble properties that the objects really have whereas our ideas of colour/felt-temperature do not.

P5: Similar arguments can be used to distinguish between the properties like shape, size, motion, number, extension/volume etc. on the one hand and properties like colour, taste, smell etc. on the other.

C: Therefore, our representation is an accurate resemblance of an object’s primary qualities but not an accurate resemblance of its secondary qualities.