PBE

Question 1

Hard Behaviourism

Answer 1

all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (i.e. analytically reduced)

Question 2

Soft Behaviourism

Answer 2

propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (using ordinary language)

Question 3

The ‘perfect actor’ objection

Answer 3

Behaviour is not sufficient for having a mental state.

we can conceive of “perfect actors”: someone who behaves identically to someone in pain but who has no pain

Question 4

The ‘super-Spartan’ objection

Answer 4

Behaviour is not necessary for having a mental state

We can conceive of ‘super-spartans’: people who have the same experiences (qualia) of pain as us but “have the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior

Question 5

HPB response to Perfect Actors and Spartans

Answer 5

This scenario is not conceivable

Question 6

Counter response to this scenario is not conceivable

Answer 6

HPB only thinks it is inconceivable due to its commitment to the VP, which is self-refuting

Question 7

Ayer’s response to the verification principle is self-refuting

Answer 7

VP is analytically true, it is a definition/analysis of how we use the word “meaningful”.

Question 8

Reply to Ayer’s response (VP is analytically true)

Answer 8

If it were an analytic truth about what we mean by “meaningful” then there’d be no debate over the truth of the VP

Question 9

SPB response to Perfect Actors and Spartans

Answer 9

The actor and the SS-Spartan have a disposition to behave that has not yet been brought about

Question 10

Counter-response to ‘the actor and the SS-Spartan have a disposition to behave that has not yet been brought about’

Answer 10

We can conceive of people who even have all the same behavioural dispositions as someone in pain, but yet STILL are not in pain

Question 11

PB cannot define mental states satisfactorily due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behave objection

Answer 11

the example of the following desire: “wants to greet people”.

if mental states are multiply realisable in the way described above, then two different people with the same mental state might act completely differently - no behaviour in common between them. This seems to contradict the claim of behaviourism. If behaviourism were correct and statements about mental state are referring to behaviour, then all people for whom that statement is true should exhibit those same behaviours.

Question 12

SPB Response to multiple realisability

Answer 12

We can explain “multiple realisability” in terms of different behavioral dispositions that depend on other mental states

Question 13

Counter response to SPB’s response to multiple realisability

Answer 13

it seems impossible to give a ‘pure’ behaviourist definition of a mental state without mentioning other mental states. This is known as the circularity issue.

Question 14

PB cannot define mental states satisfactorily due to circularity

Answer 14

the behaviourist was trying to define mental states in terms of behaviours, but they end up having to define mental states in terms of behaviours and other mental states. So mental states end up being defined, in part, by mental states

Question 15

Intentional circle

Answer 15

It is impossible to give a purely behavioural definition of desires. You have to mention the person’s beliefs.

it is impossible to give a purely behavioural definition of a belief. You have to mention the person’s desire/s.

This makes the definitions of desires and beliefs circular

Question 16

SPB response: Circularity is not a problem

Answer 16

circularity is not a problem for ‘soft’ behaviourism, only for ‘hard’ behaviourism.

This circularity just shows that mental concepts are linked up with each other in interesting ways as well as being understood in terms of behaviour.

Question 17

OBJECTION: PB ignores the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states.

Answer 17

If behaviourism is true, this suggests that my knowledge of my own mind and my knowledge of other peoples’ minds should be the same in terms of how I know about it and how much I know. This objection argues that this is false/absurd.

PB ignores introspection

Question 18

PB response to asymmetry (method)

Answer 18

The method we use is the same.

HPB: judgements made on the basis of introspection as a method would be meaningless as they cannot be publicly and empirically verified. The only method by which we can make meaningful statements about mental states is observation of behaviour

SPB: self-knowledge and our knowledge of other minds is on a par, gained in the same way in each case, by paying attention

Question 19

Counter response to PBH response to Asymmetry (method)

Answer 19

Ryle’s response may be reasonable, but it doesn’t apply to all scenarios e.g. pain

Question 20

PB response to asymmetry (certainty)

Answer 20

we can explain the differing level of certainty without asymmetry

The explanation is just that we have more empirical evidence of ourselves than we do of others

Question 21

Counter-response to PBH response to Asymmetry (certainty)

Answer 21

If empirical data was the only factor, then if I spent every waking hour with someone I ought to know their mental states with equal certainty. But I clearly do not.